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REVISED
10 June 1975

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE WORKING GROUP

Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting
1400 Hours, 20 May 1975
White House Situation Room

Chairman: Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC

Members present: Mr. Leslie H. Brown, Department of State
(representing Mr. George S. Vest, Director,
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs)
Mr. Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary
of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Mr. Foster Collins, Department of Treasury
(representing Mr. William N. Morell, Special
Assistant to the Secretary on National Security
RADM Robert P. Hilton, JCS (representing
Lt. Gen. John H. Elder, J-5, Plans and Policy)
Mr. Richard Ober, NSC Staff, Director for
Intelligence Coordination

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Briefer: [] CIA SALT Support Staff

Others present: Mr. Anthony H. Cordesman, with Mr. Ellsworth
RADM Donald Harvey, with RADM Hilton
Captain Gerald N. Dyer, with RADM Hilton

Agenda Item 1: Approval of Minutes

1. The minutes of the 12 March Working Group meeting were approved.

Agenda Item 2: SALT Briefing

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2. [] gave a presentation on Monitoring a SALT

Agreement, at the TS level. A summary of members' comments

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is being furnished to him and to the NIO for Strategic Programs. The briefing was in response to a recommendation by Mr. Ellsworth. General Wilson suggested that future meetings of the Working Group regularly include high interest presentations.

Agenda Item 3: Old Business

3. General Wilson indicated that the substantive intelligence Objectives, now in front of the DCI, will be passed back through the NSCIC Working Group to NSCIC in a few days. He said that his staff is still developing a paper on the subject of the explicit statement of uncertainties in intelligence documents. Meanwhile, he considers it healthy simply to have it known that the Working Group is concerning itself with this problem. With regard to RADM Hilton's recommendation for Terms of Reference for the NSCIC Working Group, General Wilson said his staff would draft and distribute Terms of Reference for Working Group member comments prior to the next meeting. In response to interest expressed by Mr. Morell, General Wilson gave a brief overview of

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Agenda Item 4: Mayaguez Briefing

4. General Wilson briefed the Working Group on the role of the Community in the Mayaguez incident. Essentially no part of the

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Community issued prior warning, though there had been prior incidents. Moreover the Hydrographic Office of the Defense Mapping Agency, which is responsible for issuing maritime advisories, is not linked to the Community. In addition, [] were delayed in dissemination by various operations centers, partly because the information in [] seemed "suspect," and partly because of an implicit assumption that the US would not react and that therefore time was not urgent. NOIWON was not used because "the button was not luminescent enough." Basically the operations and intelligence functions were not in dialogue on this problem. Perhaps part of the problem also is that some of the operations officers are too junior. At any rate, General Wilson declared, this problem is not going to happen again "on my watch." General Wilson added that he was instituting a practice of NOIWON "once per watch" and intended to host periodic gatherings of intelligence officers and operations center personnel.

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5. Mr. Brown noted that the operator-analyst dialogue is likely to be delayed on [] because of "classification problems." He also expressed some puzzlement as to how consumers could help to resolve the type of problem posed by the Mayaguez affair. It is one thing for consumers to say in general terms that this sort of

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problem should not arise; it is quite another thing to expect consumers to develop the technical means needed to fix the problem area.

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6. RADM Hilton said that in the Pentagon any would normally be disseminated to both NMIC and NMCC. He wanted to ensure that in connection with the Mayaguez the IC Staff had talked to NMCC. General Wilson assured him that had been done.

7. Mr. Ober said that the Mayaguez post-mortem might be a useful item to distribute to NSCIC principals for information and that the best way to do this would be through the NSCIC Working Group so that they could staff it. General Wilson agreed that it might, at least in principle. Mr. Ellsworth said that at a minimum the Working Group should get the final document, and also copies of the post-mortem on the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. General Wilson promised both.

Agenda Item 5: Information Documents

8. There were several comments by members of the Working Group on papers prepared by the IC Staff, "The DCI's Family of National Intelligence Guidance Documents," and "The Intelligence Community's Major Products, Production Elements and Points of Contact for Consumers." Mr. Ellsworth said the "Family" was a good effort, but he for one would like to know more about who writes,

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who contributes to, and who reviews the documents which comprise it. General Wilson promised a memorandum to Mr. Ellsworth on this subject.

9. Both Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Collins raised the question of the possible role of the Working Group in formulating these guidance documents. Mr. Ellsworth commented that if we (consumers) were not willing to take the time to focus on these opportunities to state consumer preferences, then we had no right to criticize the Community's performance later. General Wilson said Mr. Ellsworth's point was well worth noting.

10. Mr. Ober and Mr. Brown also expressed concern at the lack of consumer input. Mr. Ober stressed that because the schedule for drawing up guidance documents, such as the KIQs, kept slipping, the time allowed for consumers to register their views was needlessly abbreviated. Mr. Brown said that more important than the KIQs, which were often too general, were the end products; consumers should have some way of reviewing or commenting on the end product from a qualitative standpoint. General Wilson promised to express this concern to the DCI or the NIOs. RADM Hilton promised a paper dealing with the need to relate the guidance documents to the budget cycle. Mr. Collins noted that Treasury had the opportunity for

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input during the USIB review, although he also noted that he sometimes had trouble getting Treasury to provide comments.

11. With regard to the "Major Products" paper, both Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Brown said it was excellent. Mr. Ellsworth recommended that it be circulated to users as a finished product and periodically updated. He advised the adding of a section advising users on the proper channel for requesting such documents; otherwise too many consumers would be burdening the producing branches with such requests. Mr. Brown said he knew over 100 desk officers at State who ought to have this document. Mr. Collins said he would provide a page on Treasury products for the revised paper. RADM Hilton and RADM Harvey raised the possibility of including some NSA products. General Wilson promised to issue the document as an IC Staff product.

Agenda Item 6: Perspectives

12. Both Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Collins tabled written comments on the draft Perspectives. A package of these comments will be presented to the NIOs to assist them in completing the revision of the Perspectives.

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Agenda Item 7: Arab-Israeli Package

13. General Wilson gave a brief recapitulation of the "jagged line" of intelligence estimating during the period February through April 1975--i.e., on the rapidly changing assessments of whether there would be war or no war in the Middle East. Mr. Collins suggested that too many estimates are given "off-the-cuff." Perhaps the problem could be overcome by excluding estimative judgments from daily intelligence publications and by having more frequent, fully coordinated interagency estimates. Mr. Ober said that current publications should make some sort of estimates; too often, in his view, current articles were no more than a "rehash" of cables. On this particular problem, Mr. Ober said there probably should have been a revision of SNIE 30-1-75, "Next Steps in the Middle East," disseminated to the same people who got the original SNIE. Instead, a Memorandum to Holders had been produced which only went to a few people, and that was unfortunate since the Memorandum substantially altered the principal judgments of the SNIE. Mr. Ellsworth tabled comments on the Strategy Reports for KIQs 36 and 37 (which had been circulated to the Working Group in advance) and Mr. Ober promised comments on these reports before the next meeting. Mr. Ellsworth said that he hoped at some

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point to hear a discussion on the draft NIAM on Arab-Israeli military capabilities, with particular attention to the identified deficiencies in military analysis.

There was general agreement to convene the Working Group at closer intervals than the two months' interval between the Twelfth and Thirteenth meetings. The meeting adjourned at 1600 hours.

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Executive Secretary
NSCIC Working Group

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